![]() The Court of Appeals correctly found that Dale brought his T.R. He did not contest paternity during the dissolutions and chose not to appeal either support order. (7th Cir.1985), 770 F.2d 692, 697-98.ĭale filed his motion for relief in 1992, nine years after the trial court entered its first dissolution decree and six years after the second decree. Relevant to the question of timeliness is prejudice to the party opposing the motion and the basis for the moving party's delay. ![]() The determination of what constitutes reasonableness, however, varies with the circumstances of each case. 60(B)(8) must be filed within a reasonable period of time after the judgment is entered. Trial Rule 60(B)(8) provides for relief from judgment for any reason other than those set forth in Rules 60(B)(1) (mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect), 60(B)(2) (any grounds that could be raised on motion to correct error), 60(B)(3) (fraud), or 60(B)(4) (default without proper notice). We will not reweigh the evidence in conducting this review. The decision of whether to grant or deny the motion is left to the equitable discretion of the trial court, and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. When a Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion is filed, the burden is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both necessary and just. 60(B)(8) Motion?ĭale alleges the trial court erred in finding his Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion was timebarred he asserts it was filed within a reasonable period of time. Did the Trial Court Err in Denying Dale's T.R. 60(B)(8) motion for relief from judgment was untimely, the other issues are moot. Dale now petitions this Court for transfer.ĭale raises several issues in his appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on the grounds that Dale's motion was untimely and the dissolution decrees established legal paternity. In 1993, the trial court held that Dale was estopped from denying his paternity and denied his motion. Dale alleged he was entitled to relief because he was not the biological father of the child. ![]() *877 Dale sought to terminate his paternal relationship and obligations in 1992 by filing a motion for relief from judgment under Ind.Trial Rule 60(B)(8). At Dale's request, the divorce decree again recited that the boy was a child of the marriage. In 1986, Dale and Brenda were remarried and divorced for a second time. Brenda offered Dale the chance to disclaim parenthood at this point but he refused, insisting that the child be declared his child. The divorce decree listed the child as a child of the marriage. The couple was married in 1981, but divorced in 1983. With Dale's consent, he was later added to the birth certificate as the father of the child. On April 3, 1978, Brenda gave birth to a baby boy. Dale was aware of her pregnancy and knew he was not the biological father of the child. At that time, Brenda was pregnant by another man. The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that Brenda and Dale Gipson began a romantic relationship in 1977. Almost fifteen years later, he changed his mind and asked the courts to relieve him of any responsibility. Nevertheless, the husband took the child as his own and reasserted parenthood over many years. In this case, a husband married while knowing his bride has recently born a child by another man. Davis, Holder & Davis, Lafayette, for appellee. Smith, Helmerick Smith & Fountain, Lafayette, for appellant.Īnn G.
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